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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores when extraterritorial application of 
national laws is an appropriate solution to global problems. As a 
case study, the paper analyzes enforcement of national anti-
bribery legislation based on the Anti-Bribery Convention of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 
Convention). In recent years, the extraterritorial enforcement of 
national legislation has increased. The scope of such legislation 
covers many multinational corporations (MNCs) acting 
worldwide. While this way of governing MNCs makes it more 
effective for governments to hold them accountable for a number 
of global problems they cause, extraterritoriality might serve self-
interests of major economies, thus destabilizing markets, 
principles of international order, and trust among the 
international community of states. The OECD international anti-
bribery regime is an exemplary case to study because some 
OECD members, such as the U.S., have increasingly been using 
their anti-bribery laws extraterritorially. Drawing upon the 
economic and international relations literature, the starting 
point of the article is that extraterritoriality is appropriate if it 
serves the main policy goal of the international regulatory regime 
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in which it functions. This article analyzes the main policy goal of 
the OECD regime, which is based on the principle of competitive 
neutrality, meaning that all corporations compete on a level 
playing field. The paper concludes that extraterritoriality is a 
dynamic phenomenon that is appropriate when used by a small 
number of major economies in an initial stage of the anti-bribery 
regulatory framework. In the analyzed case, the increasing anti-
bribery enforcement is found to be accompanied by substantive 
and procedural fragmentation of the underlying legislation that 
prevents the OECD members from efficiently cooperating, 
coordinating their actions, and using their full potential to hold 
MNCs accountable for transnational bribery. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The undesirable transnational activities of MNCs that cause 
major global problems such as financial breakdowns, 
infringements of human rights, and corruption have been 
increasingly subject to new extraterritorial forms of national 
governmental regulation, meaning the broad application and 
enforcement of national laws to subjects acting beyond the 
borders of a given country.1 While extraterritoriality makes it 
more effective to prosecute MNCs, the literature indicates that 
extraterritorial enforcement might also serve national self-
interests, thus destabilizing markets, principles of international 
order, or international relations between states.2 Therefore, 
 
 1. JEAN-YVES HUWART & LOÏC VERDIER, ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION ORIGINS 
AND CONSEQUENCES 34 (OECD 2013); Klaus M. Leisinger, The Role of 
Corporations in Shaping Globalization with a Human Face, in 10 MPI STUDIES 
ON INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION AND TAX L., THE ROLE OF LAW AND ETHICS IN THE 
GLOBALIZED ECONOMY 27 (Joseph Straus eds. 2009); Joanne Scott, 
Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 
94 (2014); Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s 
Unexpected Legacy, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 834 (2013); Nicola Jägers, et al., The 
Future of Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Human Rights Abuses: The 
Dutch Case Against Shell, AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND e-36, e-37 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/5ZJJ-G2RW; Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal 
Landscape of the Extraterritoriality of U.S. Environmental Laws, 50 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 997, 998 (2010); Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for 
the Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59 (2010). 
 2. See Jacob Schuman, Developments in the Law - Extraterritoriality, 124 
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despite increasing use, extraterritoriality is controversial, and it 
is not clear when extraterritoriality is an appropriate response to 
the undesirable transnational activities of the MNCs. 
One of the denominators of the appropriateness of 
extraterritoriality is that it is an effective law enforcement tool of 
a regime. The question that has not been fully researched is 
when extraterritorial enforcement of national laws contributes to 
the effectiveness of the regime in which it functions. The case 
study that follows will explore this question through the OECD’s 
treatment of international bribery that depends on national 
extraterritorial enforcement. The regime based on the OECD 
Convention3 was chosen because its implementation standard 
and the focus on the enforcement and detection mechanisms of 
its signatories makes it the most advanced international 
convention that prohibits the supply side of bribery.4 It is true 
that the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC)5 is another important instrument, but the UNCAC still 
has not completed the review stage focusing on implementation, 
and, therefore, is not the key subject of analysis in this paper.6 
The theoretical basis of this article is set in Part II, which 
discusses the literature in the fields of international relations 
and economic dealings with the extraterritorial application of the 
law. The literature implies that the appropriateness of national 
 
HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011). 
 3. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1 
[hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery]. 
 4. The Transparency International considers the OECD Convention as 
“widely regarded as the gold standard for treaty monitoring.” TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS REPORT 2013: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 2 (2013) [hereinafter 
PROGRESS REPORT 2013]. 
 5. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 
Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
 6. BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 137-138 (2015); MARCO ARNONE & LEONARDO S. BORLINI, 
CORRUPTION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND INSTITUTIONS 255–270 (2014); CECILY ROSE, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION NORMS: THEIR CREATION AND INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 97–99 (2015). 
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extraterritorial enforcement for the regime’s goals is changing 
depending on its size, the level of enforcement, or the clarity of 
the regime’s norms.7 For example, in a regime with a small 
membership, national extraterritorial enforcement might 
incentivize outsiders to join the regime. However, if membership 
increases, the regime might face new credibility problems, such 
as the strategic enforcement or clarity problems connected with 
the understanding of the compliance standards with the regime’s 
norms.8 Therefore, the effectiveness of extraterritorial 
enforcement is dependent on the construction of an international 
regime––meaning its actors, norms, and processes. 
From that perspective, this article will analyze when 
national extraterritorial enforcement of the OECD-based anti-
bribery laws is an effective law enforcement tool of the OECD 
regime. The main rationale of the OECD regime is to establish 
competitive neutrality, meaning a situation in which no 
corporation operating in a relevant market enjoys any undue 
competitive advantage.9 In other words, the OECD aims to 
establish a level playing field for all corporations on the global 
market.10 At the same time, it is recognized that competitive 
neutrality requires multilateral approach of national enforcers.11 
Therefore, this article argues that two conditions are necessary 
in order to strengthen competitive neutrality: (a) corporations on 
 
 7. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); R. FALVEY, et al., 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 15 (1999); WILLIAM D. 
FERGUSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND EXCHANGE: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY (2013). 
 8. For more on the interaction between the credibility and clarity 
problems, see generally Robert Gibbons & Rebecca Henderson, Relational 
Contracts and Organizational Capabilities, 23 ORG. SCI. 1350, 1351–52 (2012); 
see also Jens Prüfer, Economic Governance Today: The Credibility Problem and 
the Clarity Problem, SIOE (Aug. 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/V3GB-Z4X3. 
 9. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY: 
MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS 9 
(2012), https://perma.cc/AB2S-B64H [hereinafter COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY]. See 
also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INFORMATION SHEET ON THE OECD 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2011), https://perma.cc/U6DX-TXVN 
[hereinafter INFORMATION SHEET ON COMBATING BRIBERY]. 
 10. INFORMATION SHEET ON COMBATING BRIBERY, supra note 9, at 32. 
 11. Id. 
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the global market do not conceal bribery through complicated 
corporate-veil systems or forum-shopping strategies; and (b) the 
OECD countries are able to coordinate enforcement and 
cooperate between each other. 
Part III analyzes the key provisions of the OECD Convention 
and refers to the implementation and enforcement of the OECD 
Convention standard in U.S. law, because this jurisdiction is 
dominant in foreign bribery enforcement.12 In Part IV, this 
article provides a more quantitative analysis. It mainly analyzes 
the enforcement activities of the U.S. and Germany following the 
ratification of the OECD Convention. Part V is more qualitative. 
It uses Bonny Island and Siemens enforcement schemes—which 
resulted in the two biggest enforcement actions in the history of 
foreign bribery enforcement—as case studies, focusing mainly on 
the substantive laws covering the foreign bribery activities, 
national jurisdiction, and coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms between the OECD enforcers.13 This article then 
concludes by delineating some key obstacles that limit the OECD 
regime in reaching competitive neutrality. 
Although a number of states, such as the U.S. and Germany, 
have adopted a variety of relatively effective enforcement 
approaches in fighting international bribery, they face a number 
of legal issues that make it difficult to coordinate their actions 
and cooperate with each other. Most importantly, extraterritorial 
enforcement is complicated because acts of international bribery 
might be fought through a number of concurrent legislations; for 
example, via money laundering or accounting provisions. 
Moreover, national procedures are also fragmented, and it is not 
feasible to define ex ante many coordination norms that would 
govern who should be in charge of the enforcement. Therefore, 
current regulatory paradigms cannot deal with substantive and 
procedural fragmentations accompanying national 
extraterritorial enforcement that remain highly political. 
 
 12. PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 87. 
 13. For the discussion about factual and formal regimes, see STEPHEN D. 
KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST GLOBAL 
LIBERALISM (1985). 
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II. APPROPRIATENESS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
A.   Controversial Way to Regulate Foreign Markets 
While extraterritoriality makes it easier to prosecute MNCs 
for their transnational bribes, it could also cause many problems. 
Some scholars claim that using extraterritoriality to govern the 
activities of the MNCs in foreign countries is moral 
imperialism.14 It means that, for example, the U.S. 
extraterritorial enforcement in Nigeria is largely the imposition 
of American legal and cultural standards in foreign markets.15 
Instead of imposing American moral values, the Nigerian 
authorities and citizens might be better off if they define for 
themselves how the MNCs should be doing business in Nigeria, 
and sanction the MNCs if they do not comply with such a 
benchmark. Therefore, even if extraterritoriality limits bribery in 
developing countries, it might dictate to these countries values 
that they do not share. 
Extraterritorial application of foreign bribery is seen as a 
necessary—but to a great extent ideological—practice of leading 
economies.16 Spahn argues that international bribery is a 
problem of class, and the corrupt relationships between MNCs 
and the governments of developing countries cannot be 
eliminated merely by soft approaches.17 Kennedy, however, 
points out that despite the fact that not many dispute that 
international corruption is detrimental, the initiatives fighting it 
remain great ideological projects.18 He claims that: 
 
 14. Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational 
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 627, 645 (2000); Steven R. Salbu, 
Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative 
Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 231 (1999). 
 15. Maxwell Adeleye, Nigeria: Multi-National Corporations in the Nigerian 
Community, DAILY INDEPENDENT (LAGOS) (Feb. 20, 
2015), https://perma.cc/A7N4-2ZAE. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Elizabeth K. Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism 
Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 155, 208 (2009). 
 18. David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 465 (1999). 
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It clearly taps into a widespread sense of illegitimacy—we 
must all oppose corruption. When one begins to define the object 
of this quite general condemnation not just morally but in terms 
of the rule of law, and to specify its link to retarded economic 
development, quite familiar difficulties emerge. Suddenly the 
effort to battle corruption becomes an effort to stigmatize some 
economic policies and some legal regimes at the expense of other 
precisely without analyzing their distributional or social 
consequences in any specific detail.19 
In this line of argument, the changes in foreign countries 
related to extraterritorial application of foreign legislation are 
not merely the question of moral values, but they also have 
important political and economic consequences.20 Spalding, for 
instance, sees anti-bribery enforcement as the imposition of 
economic sanctions against emerging markets.21 In addition, 
many other scholars discussed that the U.S. overseas 
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA)22 is too demanding.23 Despite the fact that 
extraterritorial enforcement might limit some bribery, it can 
negatively influence economic growth or the attraction of foreign 
direct investment in developing countries.24 Notwithstanding the 
fact that some firms might stop bribing, the overall economic 
situation in these countries might worsen because many firms 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Andrew B. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-
Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 351 (2010); see also Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about 
Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 803, 807 (2006). 
 22. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 23. See generally Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification 
of Cultural Norms in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 
583 (2006); Amy D. Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: 
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 
495–97 (2011); Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. OF 
INT’L L. 907 (2010); Spalding, supra note 22; Daniel P. Ashe, Comment, The 
Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial 
Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 
2899 (2005). 
 24. EDWARD ELGAR, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
LAW (Ariel Ezrachi ed. 2012). 
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may prefer to leave the market due to a high risk of prosecution 
in their home countries.25 
B.   Extraterritoriality as Inter-Governmental Communication 
A number of scholars have theorized that extraterritoriality 
could be seen as a way of inter-governmental communication—a 
domestic response to global problems that influences and takes 
into account responses of other enforcers.26 Parrish argues that 
this kind of response is unilateral rather than multilateral and 
collaborative, and thus rarely results in a sustainable solution 
that would correct distortions of global economy.27 Coffee, on the 
other hand, provides that in some fields it can be seen that, if 
used by several major economies, extraterritoriality could 
mitigate systemic risks and set an initial stage of an 
international regulatory standard.28 Such a development can also 
be seen in the area of foreign bribery––such as when the 
American unilateral initiative against international corruption 
resulted in the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.29 
Accordingly, the question that should follow is how does 
extraterritoriality function once the initial stage is surpassed? 
Slaughter and Zaring explain the dynamic changes following 
the initial stage. They argue that if multiple authorities enforce a 
new standard, the existing regime can reach a new, and better, 
equilibrium only if enforcers find political and legal instruments 
allowing them to cooperate and coordinate their actions, rather 
than using extraterritoriality as a foreign policy tool.30 Similarly, 
the economic literature provides that “each country would benefit 
 
 25. Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 21, at 803. 
 26. See John C. Coffee, Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. 
Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2014); Austen L. Parrish, 
Domestic Responses to Transnational Crime: The Limits of National Law, 23 
CRIM. L. FORUM 275 (2012). 
 27. See generally Parrish, supra note 26. 
 28. See generally Coffee, supra note 26. 
 29. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: 
International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption, 31 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
S141, S163 (2002). 
 30. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER & DAVID T. ZARING, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN A 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 27–28 (Aug. 7, 2015) https://perma.cc/8V7K-LMMX; see also 
Slaughter, supra note 7. 
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from cooperative multilateral actions taken by other countries, 
acting in their combined interests.”31 In other words, market 
success depends on resolving coordination and enforcement 
problems that usually follow the initial stages of a new 
regulatory mechanism.32 
Other theoretical literature33 provides that the resolution of 
coordination and cooperation problems is particularly difficult in 
environments with weak international treaties and organizations 
where powerful nations are the only active enforcers. 
Extraterritorial enforcement by the powerful may elicit 
transnational collective action that may remain only a sub-
optimal equilibrium. Sandler provides: 
The need for greater cooperation on some issues, raised by 
globalization, is met with nations shunning cooperative 
responses. The most powerful nations will control the agenda 
and will agree to join only loose arrangements that maintain 
their autonomy and further their agenda. The number of 
nations will continue to increase and this growth in the 
number of agents will only heighten the difficulty of 
cooperation and the preservation of uncoordinated pursuit of 
national priorities. Such an anarchic state is not an 
equilibrium because the most powerful nations will serve to 
legitimize rules and institutions to limit the need to protect 
one’s assets from plunder through conflict, pollution, or other 
means.34 
In practice, however, Sandler admits that even the most 
powerful nations might sacrifice some of their autonomy to 
international or multi-stakeholder organizations such as the 
OECD if this is in the self-interest of the parties—for instance, 
improving their communication.35 The OECD Working Group on 
Bribery in International Business Transactions that provides 
review of the implementation and the enforcement of the 
 
 31. FALVEY, supra note 7, at 16. 
 32. FERGUSON, supra note 7; see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 33. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION (2004). 
 34. Id. at 8. 
 35. Id. 
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Convention is exactly such a body.36 
C.  Extraterritoriality as Inter-Governmental Communication 
and  International Bribery 
Not many scholars have researched the national enforcement 
of international bribery laws from the perspective of political 
economy and international relations theories. Some scholars 
explained patterns of U.S. international bribery enforcement; 
Davis and Choi, for example, found mixed evidence as to why the 
U.S. engaged in a unilateral enforcement of the law.37 Abbott and 
Snidal argued earlier that the U.S. regulation resulted in the 
adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention because of the 
interplay of values and interests of the current OECD 
members.38 
Some scholars used game theoretical models in order to 
describe the internationalization of international bribery.39 In 
2002, Tarullo claimed that “the U.S. pressure succeeded only in 
getting other countries to sign the Convention, not in changing 
the underlying game being played by other countries.”40 Turk, 
however, recognized that in some instances there is an over-
enforcement of U.S. regulation prohibiting international bribery 
in developing countries.41 Although, on the other hand, Turk 
claims that when it comes to the demand side of bribary many 
countries’ foreign public officials’ have either no capacity or 
interest to enforce the law.42 Differing from Turk’s views, 
Kaczmarek and Newman found that countries that experienced 
American extraterritorial application of anti-bribery laws were 
 
 36. See Fabricio Pagani, Peer Review as a Tool for Co-Operation and 
Change: An Analysis of an OECD Working Method, 11 AFR. SEC. REV. 15, 19 
(2002). 
 37. Kevin E. Davis & Stephen J. Choi, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMP. L. STUD. 409 (2014). 
 38. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 29, at S141. 
 39. Ferguson, supra note 7. 
 40. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2004). 
 41. Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.W. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 325, 330 (2013). 
 42. Id. 
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“twenty times more likely to enforce their national rules.”43 They 
also claim that such an enforcement has “far-reaching spillover 
effects, unintentionally altering national decision-making in 
other countries.”44 Therefore, even scholars who discuss 
extraterritoriality in the context of international bribery provide 
mixed evidence about the appropriateness of extraterritoriality. 
With this in mind, Part III will analyze the main institutional 
features of the OECD regime. 
III. REGULATION OF FOREIGN BRIBERY 
This section focuses on analyzing the basis of the foreign 
bribery regulatory framework. The core of the foreign bribery 
regulation lays in international treaties.45 Nevertheless, national 
laws play a crucial role as well. Hence, the issue of appropriate 
jurisdiction is also discussed in the context of German and U.S. 
laws. This preliminary analysis focuses on what Berman calls 
“legal jurisdiction,” i.e., a set of provisions determining (1) that 
national laws apply and (2) that a given state can decide a case.46 
A.  Foreign Bribery Law in the Historical Context 
The adoption of the first comprehensive set of domestic 
norms on transnational bribery goes back to 1977, when the U.S. 
adopted its FCPA.47 The FCPA makes it an offense to provide48 
anything of value to a foreign official for purposes of securing any 
improper advantage in order to assist the actor in obtaining or 
retaining business. Thus, in contrast to American regulation of 
domestic bribery, the FCPA is special because it concentrates on 
 
 43. Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the 
Law: Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery 
Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 747 (2011). 
 44. Id. at 765. 
 45. See, e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3. 
 46. Paul S. Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 485 (2005). 
 47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95, 213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 48. “Provider” includes an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization 
of the payment. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(a). 
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bribe givers and does not address foreign public officials who are 
accepting the bribes; i.e., it exclusively affects the supply side of 
the bribery transaction.49 Furthermore, the FCPA only addresses 
public bribery in the context of international business, and covers 
foreign bribes that are provided to “foreign public officials.”50 
Finally, yet importantly, the FCPA is unique because of its 
jurisdictional provisions that allow prosecutors to reach a wide 
range of domestic and foreign subjects.51 
The process of moving from a unilateral American legislative 
initiative to international anti-corruption movement took more 
than 20 years; it was only in 1997 that the OECD Convention 
was signed.52 In this context, the Convention commits the world’s 
leading exporting countries to prohibiting the bribery of foreign 
public officials in international business transactions.53 It is true 
that the Convention currently operates in conjunction with a 
much broader system established by the UNCAC,54 but despite 
the UNCAC’s important impact on the various anti-corruption 
standards adopted by its signatories, it is outside the scope of 
this article. The OECD Convention should be understood as a 
separate case study from that of the UNCAC, and as the basis of 
the analysis of appropriate jurisdiction in the foreign bribery 
context in this article. 
At the center of the OECD Convention is Article 1, which 
specifies substantive elements constituting the offense of bribery 
of foreign public officials.55 However, the Convention is not 
limited just to the definition of the offense of bribery. Article 2 
provides that each party shall establish the liability of legal 
persons in accordance with national legal principles of each 
Party.56 Article 3 then sets a minimal standard on sanctioning.57 
Furthermore, the Convention contains specific substantive 
 
 49. See id. at §78dd-1(a). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at §§78dd-1–78dd3(1). 
 52. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 6. 
 53. Id. at 12. 
 54. Id. at 20, 41. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 8, 16. 
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requirements on money laundering (Article 7),58 accounting 
standards (Article 8),59 mutual legal assistance (Article 9),60 and 
extradition (Article 10).61 Importantly, the Convention also 
provides procedural rules related to jurisdiction (Article 4);62 
enforcement (Article 5);63 and a program of systematic 
monitoring and follow-up (Article 12).64 
Throughout the years, the Convention has furthered joint 
action and multilateral anti-corruption cooperation between 
countries, international organizations, businesses, and civil 
society.65 What can be observed is the shift from markets where 
foreign bribery was not regulated at all (before 1977), through 
one where only the U.S. formally prohibited foreign bribery 
(1977-1998), to today’s situation where 41 countries have adopted 
the Convention.66 
However, many challenges remain. The possible 
implementation problems are probably the least troubling 
because of the sophisticated monitoring mechanisms of the 
OECD Convention.67 What remains a real problem is that foreign 
bribery is still under-regulated because many countries have not 
ratified the Convention.68 Furthermore, most of the countries 
that have ratified the Convention struggle to enforce it mainly 
because of high enforcement costs.69 Last but not least, if states 
implement broad jurisdiction as required,70 there should ideally 
be multiple jurisdictions covering each case of foreign bribery. 
 
 58. Id. at 9. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 8. 
 63. Id. at 9. 
 64. Id. at 11. 
 65. Id. at 21. 
 66. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1495 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 67. PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 4, at 2. 
 68. Id. at 44. 
 69. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS REPORT 2015: 
ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING FOREIGN 
BRIBERY 7–8 (2015) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2015]. 
 70. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 8. 
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This raises the question of whether international or national 
laws provide a mechanism mitigating a number of coordination 
problems, such as when the law can deal with a situation where 
no country finds appropriate jurisdiction, or where more than one 
country would sanction the same act of bribery. 
B.  Territoriality and Nationality Jurisdiction: Wide Reach 
According to the OECD, the main rationale behind regulation 
of foreign bribery is promotion of economic and social well-being 
of people by “helping governments . . . to restore confidence in 
markets and the institutions and companies that make them 
function.”71 This is connected with the ideal of “competitive 
neutrality,” i.e., a situation in which no competitor that operates 
in a relevant market enjoys any undue competitive advantages or 
disadvantages.72 Therefore, in order to reach this policy goal, the 
foreign bribery jurisdiction should be wide enough to reach global 
corporations. Competitive neutrality cannot be achieved if 
corporations can hide behind complicated systems of corporate 
veils or use forum-shopping strategies.73 In this way, jurisdiction 
is appropriate when it is wide enough to reach all such 
companies. This thesis is further refined by two jurisdictional 
principles inherent to the OECD Convention—territoriality and 
nationality. 
The principle of territoriality is the leading standard of the 
OECD Convention.74 Article 4(1) provides that “each Party shall . 
. . establish its jurisdiction . . . when the offence is committed in 
whole or in part in its territory.”75 It also must be added that “the 
territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so 
that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not 
required.”76 This standard provides that any means of interstate 
commerce––such as the use of emails, telephones, or banking 
 
 71. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER 
LIVES 9 (2011), https://perma.cc/5RNT-GWSX. 
 72. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY, supra note 9, at 9. 
 73. See id. at 11, 60. 
 74. See Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 16. 
 75. Id. at 8. 
 76. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 16. 
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systems––are sufficient for an establishment of territorial 
jurisdiction.77 
The word “committed,” under Article 4(1),78 may be 
interpreted in such a way that an (1) act itself (subjective 
territoriality), or (2) the effects of such an act (objective 
territoriality) occurred within the territory of a given state.79 The 
latter, known as the effects doctrine,80 is especially problematic 
because it may be asserted over a wide range of foreign 
activities.81 As the OECD Convention does not provide any clear 
limitations, national enforcement authorities can use broad 
jurisdictional claims based on acts––or effects of acts––that have 
a minimal link to a territory of a given country.82 
An alternative to the principle of territoriality is the principle 
of nationality, which requires an assertion of jurisdiction against 
a state’s own nationals who committed a crime abroad, referred 
to as active nationality.83 Article 4(2) of the OECD Convention 
provides that “[e]ach [p]arty which has jurisdiction to prosecute 
its nationals for offences committed abroad shall take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction to do 
so in respect of the bribery of a foreign public official, according to 
the same principles.”84 The right to assert jurisdiction on the 
basis of nationality is undisputed.85 Nevertheless, the 
globalization of economies implies uncertainties when using this 
principle.86 Most importantly, there is no single test to establish 
the nationality of MNCs.87 Thus, the parties might take into 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Michael Barton Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT’L. L. 145, 193 (1973). 
 80. Id. at 153. 
 81. Id. at 195. 
 82. Zerk, supra note 1, at 18–19; Schuman, supra note 2. 
 83. Zerk, supra note 1, at 19, 47. 
 84. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 16. 
 85. Akehurst, supra note 79, at 156; Paul Arnell, The Case for Nationality 
Based Jurisdiction, 50 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 955 (2001); ROBERT CRYER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 47–49 (2007). 
 86. Akehurst, supra note 79, at 156. 
 87. Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Birbery Law Enforcement: The 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 44 (2012). 
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account place of incorporation, the corporation’s seat, the place 
where the most business is done, or the “nationality” of the 
corporation’s controlling entity.88 This requires parties to fill in 
these gaps by their national laws or by the enforcement practices. 
This discretion allows the parties to claim jurisdiction against a 
wide range of MNCs or to stay silent. The following text briefly 
discusses the implementation of the OECD Convention’s 
standard in U.S. and German law. 
1. U.S. Law: FCPA 
The FCPA recognizes both nationality and territoriality 
jurisdiction.89 Generally, the FCPA asserts territoriality 
jurisdiction over both nationals and foreigners who act within the 
territory of the U.S.90 The FCPA also contains “the alternative 
jurisdiction” theory based on the principle of nationality.91 
U.S. authorities claim that territoriality jurisdiction will be 
interpreted and applied broadly to three main categories of 
actors: issuers, domestic concerns, and any other persons and 
entities while in the territory of the U.S.92 
1) An “issuer” is a company that has a class of securities 
registered under Section 12 of the Securities & Exchange Act.93 
Thus, foreign companies organized outside the U.S. can also 
qualify as issuers. 
2) A “domestic concern” is any citizen, national, or resident of 
the U.S. and any corporation or other legal entity which has its 
principal place of business in the U.S. or which is organized 
under U.S. law.94 
3) “Any persons other than an issuer or a domestic concern” is 
 
 88. Danielle Ireland-Piper, Prosecutions of Extraterritorial Criminal 
Conduct and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 68 (2013). 
 89. CRIM. DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 10 (2012), https://perma.cc/2Y72-RCLG [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE.]. 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. Id. at 12. 
 92. Id. at 10; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)–78dd-3(a). 
 93. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 89, at 10, 11. 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2(h)(1). 
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any person other than a national that engages in any acts in 
the territories of the U.S.95 Such persons include business 
entities. 
2. German Law 
Similarly to the FCPA, German law also recognizes the 
principles of nationality and territoriality.96 Section 3 StGB 
provides that German criminal law applies if an act is committed 
in German territory.97 It must be noted that in Germany, bribery 
is a conduct crime, which means that the crime is completed once 
an act—not necessarily an effect of the act—takes place.98 
Nevertheless, the notion of “commitment” as used in StGB is 
broader. Section 9(1) StGB provides that: “an act is committed at 
every place the perpetrator acted . . . should have acted, or at 
which the result, which is an element of the offense, occurs or 
should occur according to the understanding of the perpetrator.”99 
Germany also recognizes nationality jurisdiction over acts of 
German citizens committed abroad.100 However, the principle of 
nationality seems to be narrower than in the case of the Bribery 
Act and the FCPA. What may lead to this limiting is that under 
German law, the corporate sanction is an “incidental 
consequence” of a criminal offence committed by the natural 
person.101 
To conclude, firstly, the Convention requires that the 
territorial basis for jurisdiction is to be interpreted broadly and 
that nationality jurisdiction is de facto mandatory for all the 
parties.102 The analysis shows that the selected national systems, 
to a great extent, comply with these requirements, and even 
common law jurisdictions that used to be absolutely territorial 
 
 95. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., U.S. REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION (1999), https://perma.cc/8FCA-
LXXT [hereinafter 1997 RECOMMENDATION]. 
 96. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 7 (Ger.). 
 97. Id. at § 3. 
 98. Id. at § 8. 
 99. Id. at § 9. 
 100. Id. at § 5. 
 101. Id. at § 5.7. 
 102. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 16. 
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have recognized the principle of nationality.103 Secondly, the 
analysis revealed that the discussed countries adopted broad 
jurisdictional frameworks. These legal systems may capture wide 
ranges of foreign subjects who commit bribery outside of the 
territories of these jurisdictions. 
C.   The Most Appropriate Jurisdiction: Too Wide to 
Coordinate? 
Next to the wide jurisdictional ambit, competitive neutrality 
requires coordination of enforcement.104 The Preamble of the 
OECD Convention states that “all countries share a 
responsibility to combat bribery in international business,” and 
calls for the “prompt criminalisation [sic] of such bribery in an 
effective and co-ordinated [sic] manner . . . .”105 In order to 
address this issue, the Convention offers a coordination 
mechanism based on a consultation procedure between relevant 
Parties in Article 4(3), which provides that “[w]hen more than 
one [p]arty has jurisdiction over an alleged offence described in 
this Convention, the [p]arties involved shall, at the request of one 
of them, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate 
jurisdiction for prosecution.”106 
Article 4(3) has an “open” character. Most importantly, it 
does not specify what the most appropriate jurisdiction is and 
how a jurisdictional conflict between parties should be resolved 
procedurally. In other words, the OECD Convention provides no 
substantive criteria and no procedural mechanism that would 
govern such a consultation. Moreover, the consultation 
mechanism does not provide for any legal consequences in case 
the parties do not reach an agreement about what the most 
appropriate jurisdiction is. According to the literature, no public 
international law sufficiently addresses the question.107 
 
 103. Prior to 1998, the FCPA was based only on territorial jurisdiction. See 
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 104. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY, supra note 9, at 87. 
 105. Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 3, at 6. 
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Thus, it is mainly up to the national legal orders to decide 
whether and how they limit their discretion. The U.S. and 
Germany both recognize the possibility of consulting with a view 
toward determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.108 Both of them also ratified the UNCAC that 
provides some additional guidance, mainly incentivizing bilateral 
agreements regarding coordination.109 However, Germany and 
the U.S. have not codified any general coordination norm. In 
practice, the U.S. provides regular consultations.110 Germany 
refers to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters,111 diplomatic consultations, and an extradition 
request that provides limited legal bases for such a consultation 
conducted by the German authorities.112 
A weak or non-existent coordination mechanism might lead 
to a situation in which several enforcers prosecute the same act 
of bribery that may lead to a waste of resources for the 
enforcement authorities. In recent years, because of an 
increasing number of active enforcers and the anti-bribery 
enforcement actions, this has become a practical concern.113 The 
question is whether Article 4(3) of the OECD Convention 
establishes a standard protecting this situation. Some argue that 
the Convention itself is the source of such a protection.114 
However, the provision can be also interpreted in a way that the 
Parties have an obligation to consult and not to decline 
prosecution if the other party already decided the case.115 No 
matter which interpretation stands, the practical outcome is that 
it is up to the parties how they implement the provision and how 
they act in practice when facing a case prosecuted or decided 
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elsewhere. 
Both civil law and common law systems have developed 
mechanisms to prevent some of the possible jurisdictional 
overlaps. Civil law uses the old Roman law principle called ne bis 
in idem that is, in a way, similar to the principle of double 
jeopardy in common law jurisdictions.116 However, these 
principles usually apply only to domestic cases.117 U.S. law does 
not apply any general standard preventing jurisdictional overlap 
at the international level.118 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court 
uses the so-called “dual sovereignty” doctrine that limits the 
effective use of double jeopardy when more than one sovereign is 
prosecuting the case.119 Colangelo, in his extensive analysis of 
double jeopardy, comments: “by labeling successively prosecuting 
entities separate sovereigns, the Court permits multiple 
prosecutions and ends all further discussion under the 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.”120 The U.S. authorities 
approach the issue of overlapping jurisdiction on a case-by-case 
basis while also taking into account many variables. The U.S. 
claims that this is necessary because in many cases their 
counterparties do not cooperate—even if the US provides them 
with necessary evidence for a given bribery case.121 
To give an example from a civil law jurisdiction, the OECD 
reports indicate that Germany is open to cooperation with other 
enforcers.122 However, the German authorities are otherwise 
silent about the issue of overlapping jurisdictions.123 
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Furthermore, the problem with ne bis in idem is that the 
principle traditionally prevents a subsequent prosecution and 
conviction of the same matter only in criminal matters.124 
Moreover, it usually applies only once a court reaches a final 
decision.125 
IV. ANTI-BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY US AND 
GERMANY 
A. The United States 
The U.S. is the leader in the enforcement of foreign bribery 
laws.126 Robust U.S. enforcement is, however, a relatively recent 
practice, as the U.S. has only conducted most of its big bribery 
cases since 2007.127 While from 2002 to 2006 the DOJ and the 
SEC conducted an average of three enforcement actions against 
corporations per year, it increased to an average of 14.25 
enforcement actions between 2007 to 2014.128 US authorities 
imposed financial penalties in the form of fines, disgorgement, 
and pre-judgment interest in the amounts of $87 million in 2006, 
$1.8 billion in 2010, and $1.57 billion in 2014.129 In recent years, 
the trends suggest that the U.S. agencies focus on a relatively 
small number of global bribery schemes that generate high value 
of penalties; in 2014 for instance, the U.S. pursued actions 
against Alstom ($772 million), Alcoa ($384 million), Avon ($135 
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million), and Hewlett-Packard ($108 million).130 
B. Germany 
German enforcement against corporations occurs at a much 
lower rate than in the U.S.131 The TI data indicate that from 
January 2011 to December 2014 Germany concluded ten major 
cases (but only two major cases in the last two years) as 
compared to sixty-two U.S. cases.132 Germany acquired a high 
amount of points that contributed to its status of the second most 
active enforcer because it concluded sixty-four minor cases 
compared to only forty-six minor cases in the U.S.133 
Furthermore, Germany scored high because of their enforcement 
against natural persons rather than big multinational 
corporations.134 On the one hand, according to the OECD 
monitoring reports, from January 2005 to December 2010, sixty-
nine individuals were sanctioned,135 while from March 2011 to 
March 2013, 141 individuals were sanctioned in twenty-one 
cases.136 On the other hand, the Phase 3 report indicates that 
between 2007 and 2010, six legal persons were subjected to an 
administrative sanction after a court decision.137 The Phase 3 
follow up report states that there were six other legal persons 
sanctioned up until March 2013.138 This study has not identified 
any other major case after March 2013, which means that from 
January 2011 to December 2015, Germany concluded, in total, 
twelve corporate enforcement actions. 
Out of the twelve corporate actions, three are related to the 
Siemens enforcement scheme.139 In addition, Germany was also 
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an original enforcer in four significant enforcement actions that 
were not publicized. Firstly, German prosecutors successfully 
sanctioned two units of MAN AG: the Truck unit,140 and the 
Turbo engines unit.141 According to the FCPA Blog, MAN AG has 
paid €250 million in fines and investigation costs.142 Secondly, 
the Phase 3 follow up report refers to “a fine pursuant to § 30 
OWiG in the amount of approximately EUR 140,000,000,”143 
according to secondary sources imposed against Ferrostaal AG by 
the Munich I Public Prosecutor’s Office.144 Finally, the Trace 
Compendium and other sources refer to an agreement by LINDE 
AG to pay the state of Bavaria €35 million to resolve corruption 
allegations.145 Unfortunately, these enforcement actions cannot 
be analyzed because German authorities rarely publicize 
information about concluded foreign bribery cases––a practice for 
which Germany faces criticism.146 
V. U.S. ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES - SIEMENS AND 
BONNY ISLAND 
The previous section draws a basic regulatory framework, 
assuming that national enforcement captures foreign bribery 
schemes through a relatively coherent set of specific anti-bribery 
norms. However, we will see that when it comes to the 
application of law in concrete cases, many other national legal 
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provisions are relevant and may influence anti-bribery 
enforcement.147 The following part contains an analysis of two 
enforcement schemes––Siemens and Bonny Island. The illegal 
activities of the violators are very different from each other. The 
first one is an example of endemic bribery of a corporation that 
has developed a culture of corruption and was charged for 
thousands of payments in substantively unrelated projects. The 
other is a substantively homogenous scheme in which many 
corporations engaged in bribery. We will see that enforcers use a 
number of legal paths through which they captured foreign 
bribes.148 The analysis is divided into two stages: First, the main 
characteristics of the enforcement schemes are introduced; 
Second, the results of the analysis are presented. 
A. Endemic Bribery: “Siemens as a Single Briber” 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG) was, at the end of 
2008, a multinational corporation organized under German law 
with its main offices in Berlin and Munich.149 As a global market 
player in telecommunications, electronics, electrical engineering, 
transportation, and medicine, Siemens employed roughly 405,000 
employees and operated through its subsidiaries, agents, and 
other groups and individuals in some 190 countries.150 As of 
March 12, 2001 onward, Siemens was listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).151 
1. The Core of the Enforcement Scheme—U.S. and Germany 
Siemens has been subject to various corruption scandals in 
multiple jurisdictions.152 In 2006, the Italian authorities 
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sanctioned Siemens for bribing the Italian energy utility 
corporation Enel.153 The German prosecutor in Darmstadt 
consequently opened a criminal investigation against several 
Siemens employees to complement the Italian enforcement.154 
The German authorities at that time did not sanction the 
company.155 
The core of the Siemens enforcement scheme lies in U.S. and 
German cases covering a number of charges. For instance, the 
SEC determined that Siemens accepted responsibility for bribes 
in projects such as the construction of metro transit system in 
Venezuela, construction of metro trains and signaling devices in 
China, building and servicing power plants in Israel, installation 
of mobile telephone service in Bangladesh, and in the design and 
installation of a traffic system in Russia.156 Siemens also 
participated, via its French, Turkish, and other subsidiaries, in 
the Oil-For-Food Program bribery scheme in Iraq.157 
At the first stage, Germany and the U.S. sanctioned Siemens 
for paying bribes.158 The U.S. SEC concluded that between March 
12, 2001 and September 2007 Siemens made 4,283 bribery 
payments totaling approximately $1.4 billion.159 Foreign public 
officials received bribes through a variety of mechanisms, such as 
direct payments to business consultants, payments to 
intermediaries, or slush funds controlled by non-Siemens 
trustees.160 Siemens even established special cash desks in their 
offices that served for its employees to withdraw cash for the 
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purpose of bribery.161 
At the second stage, Siemens violated German and U.S. laws 
because it systematically circumvented internal controls and 
falsified books and records.162 In order to escape potential 
investigation based on domestic anti-corruption laws, Siemens 
was already falsifying its transactions before bribery of foreign 
public officials was criminalized at the international level.163 
During the German and U.S. investigations, it became clear that 
“[f]rom the 1990s through 2007, Siemens engaged in a systematic 
and widespread effort to make and to hide hundreds of millions 
of dollars in bribe payments across the globe.”164 Siemens used, 
for example, off-books accounts, false invoices, and fake 
consulting agreements.165 
The main line of U.S. and German cases consists of seven 
settlements between the company and the German and the 
American authorities, with one being reached in 2007166 and six 
in 2008 (the main case).167 The following overview shows these 
settlements in more detail. 
1) October 4, 2007: Germany, Munich Public Prosecution 
Office v. Siemens AG. The Munich district court ordered 
Siemens AG to pay €201 million ($285 million) for bribes of 
Siemens’s Telecommunications Unit in Russia, Nigeria and 
Libya. Two-hundred million Euros included unlawfully 
obtained economic advantages; €1 million served as an 
additional administrative fine.168 
2) December 15, 2008: Siemens AG v. Germany, Munich 
Public Prosecution Office. This settlement was part of the main 
 
 161. See Statement of Offense, supra note 151, at 22. 
 162. Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 4, U.S. v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft/Argentina/Bangladesh/Venezula, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL 
(D.C.C. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 163. Complaint, supra note 149, at 7. 
 164. Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Siemens AG and Three 
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 15 2008), https://perma.cc/5634-H62P. 
 165. Id. 
 166. SIEMENS AG, TRACE INT’L COMPENDIUM, supra note 152, at 7. 
 167. Id. 
 168. SIEMENS AG, SIEMENS ANNUAL REPORT 2007, (2008), 
https://perma.cc/9K54-B4ES. 
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case that Germany coordinated with the US authorities (see 3-
5 below). The Munich district court ordered Siemens to pay 
€394.75 million ($529 million) for unlawfully obtained 
economic advantages and €250,000 as an administrative 
penalty.169 
3) December 15, 2008: United States v. Siemens AG, DOJ. On 
the same day as the German authorities, the DOJ settled with 
Siemens for $448.5 million in criminal fines.170 Furthermore, 
sanctions also included implementation of a rigorous 
compliance system and a four-year review by an independent 
compliance monitor.171 
4) December 12, 2008: United States v. Siemens S.A. 
(Argentina)/United States v. Siemens Bangladesh 
Limited/United States v. Siemens S.A. (Venezuela).172 In three 
separate proceedings, the DOJ settled with three wholly-owned 
Siemens subsidiaries. For each of them, the DOJ imposed a 
$500,000 criminal fine.173 
5) December 15, 2008: United States v. Siemens AG, SEC. The 
SEC, in a civil proceeding, also settled with Siemens AG where 
the corporation agreed to pay $350 million in disgorgement of 
wrongful profits.174 
2. Follow-up Enforcement 
After these cases, other jurisdictions investigated and 
punished Siemens for its bribes, with the World Bank, Nigeria, 
and Greece conducting the most significant cases.175 Firstly, the 
World Bank settled in July 2009 with Siemens in relation to its 
co-financed project in Russia.176 The consequences for Siemens 
were significant as it agreed to refrain from bidding on the World 
Bank’s projects for two years, to dedicate $100 million to combat 
corruption, and the World Bank debarred the Siemens’ 
 
 169. SIEMENS AG, TRACE INT’L COMPENDIUM, supra note 152, at 6. 
 170. Department’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 162, at 14. 
 171. For calculation of the fine and its justification, see id. at 11. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 14–15. 
 174. SIEMENS AG, TRACE INT’L COMPENDIUM, supra note 152, at 18. 
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subsidiary in Russia for four years.177 
Secondly, in November 2010, Siemens settled in Nigeria on 
the basis of the Nigerian domestic anti-corruption law.178 The 
settlement is confidential, but secondary sources imply that $46 
million was paid to the Nigerian government.179 
Thirdly, in April 2012, the Greek parliament adopted an ad 
hoc legislation that allowed Greece to settle with Siemens for 
approximately €270 million ($355.7 million).180 Due to the 
general character of the settlement—and a special immunity 
granted to Siemens for all bribes until the day of the 
settlement—it is not clear what particular projects the 
settlement covered.181 
3. Applicable Laws 
The Siemens case shows that the German and the U.S. 
settlements cover a broad range of illicit conduct, including 
unrelated business projects. Applicable laws that captured these 
activities are presented in Table 1 below. Germany demonstrated 
that in two settlements. In the 2007 enforcement against 
Siemens’s Telecommunication Unit, the German court held 
Siemens AG liable as part of the criminal proceedings, pursuant 
 
 177. Press Release, World Bank Grp., Siemens to Pay $100m to Fight 
Corruption as Part of World Bank Group Settlement (July 2, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/C9L4-Y7HL. 
 178. HALLIBURTON/KBR, TRACE INT’L COMPENDIUM (2015), 
https://perma.cc/ZLA3-4DNQ. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Press Release, Siemens AG, Siemens & the Hellenic Republic Reach a 
Settlement Agreement and Mark a New Beginning (Apr. 5, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/WJQ8-ADDM. 
 181. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative claims that the matter being 
settled was defined as: 
[A]ny and all matters, claims, and allegations to date, whether known 
or unknown relating to corruption; payments to (or promises to pay) 
third parties; other illegal activities on the part of Siemens, including 
without limitation all matters investigated by any Greek, German, or 
U.S. authority or [Siemens’ law firm], including matters covered by 
Siemens’ 2008 settlement with the German authorities and the SEC 
and DOJ in the United States. 
See ODUOR, supra note 116, at 134. 
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to § 30 OWiG and in conjunction with § 334 StGB (offering a 
bribe) and § 266(1) StGB (breach of trust) against its former 
employees.182 This enforcement action does not fully capture the 
systemic character of the Siemens bribing and relates to crimes 
of specific individuals.183 However, one year later, the German 
authorities acted more loosely and imposed an independent 
regulatory fine through a prosecution of natural persons.184 
Moreover, they applied § 30 OWiG in conjunction with § 130 
OWiG, which allowed them to capture the breach of a 
supervisory duty, meaning that the German courts also covered 
acts of lower-ranked employees committing offences because of 
insufficient supervision by managers and other relevant 
employees.185 
The U.S. enforcement action included criminal settlements of 
the DOJ and a civil settlement of the SEC.186 The DOJ settled 
with Siemens based on a violation of the FCPA’s internal 
controls, and books and records provisions under 15 U.S.C. 
§§78m(b)(2)(A),187 78m(b)(2)(B),188 78m(b)(5),189 and 78ff(a).190 
Although the DOJ took into account many individual acts of 
bribery when determining a criminal fine,191 the settlement 
punishes a systemic failure. The SEC acted differently, although 
it also based its fines on the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions 
 
 182. GERMANY PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 122. 
 183. Note that corporate liability is in Germany determined by a liability of 
natural persons. Id. 
 184. They based their claim on application of § 30(1) (4) OWiG and an 
exception under § 30(4). 
 185. See Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg, Nochmals Schmiergeldaffaire: 
Staatsanwaltschaft München I erlässt Bußgeldbescheid in Höhe von 395 
Millionen € gegen Siemens, BECK-BLOG (Dec. 12, 2008), https://perma.cc/MYC2-
X4CK. 
 186. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 
Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), https://perma.cc/Y6XS-
MBGM. 
 187. Richard L. Cassin, Final Settlements For Siemens, THE FCPA BLOG 
(Dec. 15, 2008, 7:22 PM), https://perma.cc/57AW-MNV7; see also Statement of 
Offense, supra note 151. 
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under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1.192 The DOJ did not charge Siemens 
AG with the violation of the anti-bribery provisions, despite the 
language of the settlement, which gives the impression that the 
DOJ collected sufficient evidence to do so.193 
Table 1: Fragmentation of Substantive Laws 
 
Last but not least, the settlements with Siemens’ 
headquarters are complemented with relatively minor charges 
directed at foreign subsidiaries of the company.194 These included 
bribes to foreign public officials on behalf of Siemens’ 
headquarters, while Siemens AG recorded the bribes as 
legitimate expenses in its books and records.195 Thus, the DOJ 
charged them with conspiring with Siemens AG to violate the 
FCPA’s books and records provisions under 15 U.S.C. 
§§78m(b)(2)(A) and §§78m(b)(5).196 Furthermore, Siemens 
Bangladesh and Siemens Venezuela were also charged with 
conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions under 15 U.S.C. 
 
 192. See Complaint, supra note 149, at 1. 
 193. See Statement of Offense, supra note 151. 
 194. Subsidiaries paid $500,000 each. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
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§§78dd(3).197 Table 2 below shows an overview of the bribery 
charges. 
B. Bonny Island Project: “We’ll Get Them All” 
The TSKJ joint venture was established in 1991 in order to 
bid for contracts related to the Bonny Island Project, the project 
focused on designing and building liquefied natural gas 
production plants in Nigeria.198 The TSKJ consisted of four 
members: 
a) Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, (KBR, LLC), which was a 
wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of the Halliburton Company—a 
US “issuer” (Halliburton). After January 2009, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., became a U.S. 
“issuer” (KBR, Inc.); 
b) Technip SA (Technip), was a company organized under 
French law and from August 2001 until November 2007 acted 
as an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA; 
c) Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. (Snamprogetti), a company 
organized under Dutch law, was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
ENI S.p.A. (ENI), an Italian “issuer.” ENI sold Snamprogetti to 
Saipem S.p.A. (Saipem) in 2006. ENI owns 43% of Saipem, 
which constitutes a controlling share; and 
d) JGC Corporation (JGC), a company headquartered in 
Tokyo, Japan. 
1. The Core of the Enforcement Scheme 
The TSKJ operated in Nigeria through several subsidiaries 
and agents that, between 1995 and 2004, acted on behalf of the 
TSKJ.199 These companies were: 
a) LNG Service, a company based in Madeira, Portugal (LNG 
Madeira). The TSKJ established LNG Madeira to conclude 
 
 197. See id.; see also Press Release, supra note 186. 
 198. Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 
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contracts with their agents based in Gibraltar and Tokyo;200 
b) M.W. Kellogg Limited (MWKL), a UK subsidiary of KBR 
and JGC that these companies used in order to channel funds 
to the LNG Madeira;201 
c) Tri-Star Investments Ltd. (Tri-Star Gibraltar), a consulting 
corporation based in Gibraltar, an agent of the TSKJ;202 and 
d) Marubeni Corporation (Marubeni), a company 
headquartered in Tokyo, Japan,203 another agent of the 
TSKJ.204 
Nigeria LNG, established by the Nigerian government, had 
the right to award contracts related to the Bonny Island 
Project.205 The biggest shareholder of Nigeria LNG was the 
government owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), which owned a 49% share.206 
The TSKJ took part in the Bonny Island Project between the 
years 1995-2004.207 During that time, Nigeria LNG awarded the 
TSKJ four contracts worth $6 billion in order to design and build 
natural gas plants.208 The TSKJ members participated in the 
Project equally.209 The TSKJ bribed officials and employees of 
Nigeria LNG, in order to win the contracts.210 It hired two 
agents, Tri-Star Gibraltar and Marubeni, and used them for 
bribing—Tri-Star paid over $130 million to higher-ranked 
 
 200. Indictment, United States v. Jeffrey Tesler, et al., No. H-09-098 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Indictment]. 
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officials, while Marubeni paid over $50 million to lower ranked 
officials.211 The money allocated for bribing was sent from LNG 
Madeira’s account in Amsterdam to Swiss, Monaco, and 
Japanese banks controlled by the agents.212 Bank transfers to 
Switzerland and Monaco were sent via correspondent accounts in 
New York.213 This fact played an important role in asserting 
jurisdiction over the members of the joint venture.214 
In 2003, the French authorities were already investigating a 
former high official of Technip because of bribery schemes in 
Africa and Asia.215 The official informed the French authorities 
about other bribery schemes, including the Bonny Island case.216 
Consequently, the French opened an investigation that triggered 
the attention of U.S., Swiss, and Nigerian authorities.217 
From 2008 until 2012, the United States enforced its anti-
bribery laws against all members of the TSKJ, the Marubeni as 
their agent, and several individuals.218 The enforcement scheme 
consisted of five related cases divided into eight criminal and civil 
settlements with the DOJ and the SEC.219 All of these cases deal 
with the same subject matter. The following overview discusses 
these settlements in more detail. 
a) KBR, LLC, KBR, Inc., and Halliburton - $579    
        million 
On February 11, 2009, the DOJ and the SEC, in their 
coordinated enforcement action, sanctioned KBR, LLC, and its 
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parent companies, Halliburton and KBR, Inc.220 It is important to 
note that KBR, LLC, plead guilty and settled criminal charges 
with the DOJ for $402 million.221 However, Halliburton paid 
most of the fine—$382 million—because of an indemnification 
agreement that Halliburton and KBR entered into during their 
separation in 2009.222 Furthermore, the SEC settled with 
Halliburton and KBR, Inc. for a civil penalty of $177 million; 
Halliburton paid the civil sanction.223 The indemnification 
agreement did not prevent KBR from all sanctions as it had, for 
instance, an obligation to be reviewed by an independent monitor 
for three years.224 
b) Technip - $338 million 
On June 28, 2010, the second member of the TSKJ settled 
with the DOJ and the SEC—Technip entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with the DOJ to pay $240 
million.225 Furthermore, the SEC settled with Technip for a civil 
sanction of $98 million and disgorged gains obtained from their 
bribery.226 
c) Snamprogetti - $365 million 
On July 7, 2010, the third member of the TSKJ settled with 
the DOJ and the SEC when Snamprogetti entered into a DPA 
with the DOJ to pay $240 million.227 Furthermore, the SEC 
entered into a civil settlement with ENI and Snamprogetti.228 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC 
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million 
Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), https://perma.cc/Y4V8-LSZH. 
 222. SHEARMAN AND STERLING, supra note 129, at 295 (citing SEC v. 
Halliburton, Co., et al., No. 4:09-cv-00399 (S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Technip S.A., 
No. H-10-439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010). 
 226. SHEARMAN AND STERLING, supra note 129, at 100 (citing U.S. v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root LLC, No. 4:090-cr-00071 (S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
 227. Note also that ENI and Saipem were part of the settlement on behalf of 
Snamprogetti; see Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, 6, United States v. 
Snamprogetti Neth. B.V., No. H-10-460 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2010). 
 228. SHEARMAN AND STERLING, supra note 129, at 73 (citing U.S. v. 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 11 
340 
They agreed jointly and severally to disgorge $98 million of gains 
obtained because of their bribery.229 ENI paid the fine, as it had 
agreed to indemnify Saipem for potential losses and charges 
resulting from the TSKJ investigations.230 
d) JGC - $218.8 million 
On April 6, 2011, the last member of the TSKJ settled with 
the DOJ: JGC entered into DPA with the DOJ to pay $218.8 
million.231 
e) Marubeni - $54.6 million 
On January 17, 2012, Marubeni, an agent of the TSKJ, 
entered into a DPA with the DOJ to pay $54.6 million.232 
All of the defendants, as part of their settlements, agreed to 
several other sanctions, such as retaining independent 
compliance monitors and independent consultants.233 Some of 
them also agreed to implement better compliance and ethics 
programs.234 
2. Follow-up Enforcement 
The U.S. cases were not the only ones, as the Nigerian, U.K., 
and Italian authorities also investigated and punished the 
members of the TSKJ for their bribes in the Bonny Island 
Project.235 Firstly, the Nigerian authorities, between 2010 and 
2011, sanctioned all of the TSKJ’s members based on Nigerian 
domestic anti-corruption laws.236 The settlements are 
confidential, but secondary sources indicate that the companies 
paid approximately $126 million: JGC $28.5 million, 
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Snamprogetti $32.5 million, KBR/Halliburton $35 million, and 
Technip $30 million.237 These settlements, similar to those in the 
Siemens case, granted wide immunities to the companies and 
individuals, including Dick Cheney, the former Halliburton CEO 
and former U.S. vice president.238 
Secondly, on February 16, 2011, the UK Serious Fraud Office 
(“SFO”) took actions to the High Court against MWKL, the UK-
based subsidiary of KBR and JPG.239 The SFO reported that 
MKWL settled for over £7 million (over $11 million) for a civil 
sanction.240 The Court ordered the disgorgement of profits that 
MWKL acquired as the result of the anti-bribery violations of the 
third parties.241 MWKL also agreed to improve its internal 
control mechanisms.242 As a result, the Court did not apply the 
UK’s foreign bribery laws, choosing instead Part 5 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.243 
Thirdly, on July 11, 2013, the Court of Milan in Italy ordered 
Snamprogetti to pay over €24.5 million (over $31.8 million) for 
confiscation of illegally obtained gains related to the Bonny 
Island Project.244 Moreover, the company paid €0.6 million ($0.78 
million) as an administrative fine.245 The company unsuccessfully 
appealed the decision in February 2015.246 Currently, the Court 
of Cassation is examining the decision.247 
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3. Applicable Laws 
The Bonny Island case covers a single, decade-long bribery 
scheme.248 In this scheme, several companies coming from 
various jurisdictions acted towards the same end.249 The U.S. 
enforcement agencies settled with five of these companies.250 The 
DOJ and the SEC based their settlements on substantive 
violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, company books 
and records, and internal controls provisions; they also factored 



















Table 2: Applicable Laws in Bonny Island Enforcement Scheme 
 
Table 2 above shows that the DOJ did not apply the record-
keeping and internal controls provisions. Rather, the DOJ settled 
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with the members of the TSKJ and Marubeni by applying the 
anti-bribery provisions.252 KBR and Technip were sanctioned for 
substantive violations while the others were qualified as 
accomplices, either by conspiracy or by aiding and abetting to 
KBR’s and Technip’s violations.253 The SEC, in contrast to the 
DOJ, enforced not only the anti-bribery provision but also the 
record-keeping and internal controls provisions. Nevertheless, 
the SEC covered only “issuers” and their subsidiaries, i.e., KBR, 
Technip, and Snamprogetti. 
C. Enforcement Practice and Appropriate Jurisdiction 
The U.S. is the absolute leader in the OECD Convention’s 
enforcement, and uses a number of techniques in order to capture 
a wide range of bribery activities on the global market.254 The 
two examples above show that the U.S. authorities use broad 
jurisdictional claims reaching the activities of corporations, their 
agents, subsidiaries, and other affiliated persons taking part all 
around the world.255 
1. U.S.-Wide Jurisdiction 
1) Territorial Nexus Interpreted Broadly: The U.S. 
authorities interpret what constitutes a nexus with their 
territory broadly.256 For instance, we see a discussion of whether 
the U.S. authorities may claim jurisdiction once the bribery 
payments were channeled through a correspondent bank account 
in the U.S.257 Most likely, such a transfer is not by itself a 
sufficient ground for U.S. jurisdiction, because it has always been 
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mentioned in combination with other arguments.258 For instance, 
in the Hewlett-Packard (HP) bribery scheme, HP Poland 
organized a trip for an official to San Francisco, or in another 
instance, management of HP Russia discussed the Russian GPO 
project with HP in the United States via an email which was 
routed through the United States.259 We saw above that JGC 
Corporation—a Japanese non-issuer—allegedly used the U.S. 
correspondent account, but was rather charged with conspiracy 
and aiding and abetting260 under §§78dd-1 and 2.261 
2) Conspiracy, aiding and abetting charges: Many 
foreign companies are reached by the use of conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting charges.262 For instance, only one member of 
the TSKJ was a U.S.-based company, but at the end, all non-U.S. 
members of the joint venture and their foreign agent fell under 
U.S. jurisdiction.263 For example, Marubeni, a foreign agent of 
the TSKJ, was charged despite the fact that it never acted while 
in the US.264 It is therefore irrelevant whether potential actions 
of non-U.S. companies take any action in the U.S. once at least 
one co-conspirator was under U.S. jurisdiction. Similar claims 
also appeared in charges against the Siemens’ foreign 
subsidiaries. 
3) Liability for acts of others: Once a given company is an 
issuer, the U.S. authorities cover all subsidiaries controlled by 
the issuer, practically treating them as a parent company.265 
Together with the use of conspiracy charges, this allows 
authorities to cover all elements of formal and informal corporate 
structures, including foreign agents.266 We also see that the U.S. 
authorities skip piercing of the corporate veil analysis in other 
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cases, such as against Ralph Lauren.267 
2. German Enforcement is Limited 
German enforcement against corporations is much lower 
than U.S. enforcement practices.268 Germany has concluded ten 
major cases between 2011 and 2014, with only two cases in the 
last two years, compared to 62 U.S. cases.269 According to 
Transparency International, Germany acquired a high amount of 
points that contributed to its status as the second most active 
enforcer because it concluded 64 minor cases compared to 46 
cases in the U.S.270 Furthermore, Germany scores high because of 
their enforcement against natural persons rather than big 
multinational corporations.271 The lack of enforcement may lay in 
a number of political, economic, and legal reasons. 
Firstly, the use of conspiracy, aiding and abetting charges, or 
de facto strict liability over foreign subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations is not present in German enforcement.272 
Furthermore, Germany does not recognize criminal liability of 
corporations, and the corporate sanction is the consequence of a 
criminal offense committed by a natural person.273 
Secondly, some of the U.S. techniques that make enforcement 
so effective undermine the German rule of law. In this light, the 
lack of enforcement toward corporations may be connected with 
more deeply rooted differences between Europe and the U.S. in 
recognizing some essential legal concepts and principles, such as 
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due process considerations.274 The way U.S. agencies proceed 
with their cases—using their bargaining power in settlements, 
vague corporate liability charges, or leveraging jurisdiction based 
on conspiracy charges—may not be possible in Germany because 
these practices would not pass the constitutional scrutiny of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court.275 
Thirdly, the U.S. is the leader in the OECD Convention’s 
enforcement not because of its laws on jurisdiction and effective 
procedures, but mainly because of its position in the global 
market.276 The U.S. can leverage its jurisdiction towards a 
significant amount of multinational corporations and lower the 
high costs of enforcement by punishing complex bribery 
schemes.277 On the other hand, Germany and other countries––
such as the U.K. or Switzerland––may not be in a position that 
would allow them to enforce in such a magnitude. 
All these aspects may put a country like Germany into a 
position where the costs of an original enforcement action are too 
high. Nevertheless, even if this is the case, countries such as 
Germany are crucial for the U.S. because without their 
cooperation, even dedicated enforcement leaders would not catch 
some global bribery schemes in their complexity, or even at all. 
Germany provides additional evidence and other enforcement 
assistance and thereby decreases the enforcement costs to U.S. 
authorities.278 Currently, Germany and similar jurisdictions can 
be considered an important partner and follow-up enforcement 
country that has a difficult time catching foreign bribery schemes 
because of their complexity, and cannot be expected to conduct 
many significant enforcement actions by itself. 
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3. Coordination and Cooperation—Unity of the Case is Blurred 
This case analysis points towards significant substantive and 
procedural fragmentation that makes coordination and 
cooperation, even within the OECD, difficult.279 This difficulty 
relates to the leeway given by the principle of functional 
equivalence that lays at the heart of the OECD Convention.280 
Functional equivalence, for example, allows enforcers to decide 
how the case will be constructed and qualified, and allows the 
use of multiple proceedings.281 In this light, designing ex ante 
norms on cooperation and coordination within the OECD may not 
be appropriate, or even possible, because we struggle to define 
what constitutes the unity of a foreign bribery case. The following 
paragraphs discuss the key aspects of substantive and procedural 
fragmentation. 
1) Substantive Law Fragmentation and Types of 
Foreign Bribery Schemes 
There is usually not a single briber and a single act of 
bribery. Depending on the strategy of a given enforcer, foreign 
bribery enforcement actions may present these acts in several 
different ways. 
The Siemens scheme is an example of an endemic bribery 
scheme that is not confined to one bribery payment, but rather 
includes an array of different transactions scattered throughout 
the world.282 What can be seen is that it covers a set of thousands 
of individual bribes conducted by Siemens’ agents, subsidiaries, 
and other persons acting on its behalf.283 In other words, 
Germany and the U.S. were sanctioning systemic violations of 
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multiple foreign bribery laws. 
On the other hand, the Bonny Island scheme included a 
much smaller number of projects, but many corporations 
participated in the bribery.284 The scheme is relatively 
homogenous as it focuses on a single subject matter and 
transaction.285 This is different from the Siemens case, which 
covered a much broader range of activities.286 The main issue is 
that although the U.S. authorities focused on a single subject 
matter, the enforcement covered nearly every entity involved in 
the bribery.287 This way of enforcement best fits the idea of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that is important in reaching the 
illegal activities of MNCs in all of their complexity. 
One more example may be considered. There are a number of 
cases—such as the FIFA corruption scandal—where bribe-givers 
and bribe-takers are two constituent elements of a foreign 
bribery scheme.288 Despite the fact that the latter are, in 
principle, outside the scope of foreign bribery laws, enforcement 
authorities can sometimes extend their jurisdiction and capture 
them as well.289 For instance, we can see that organization such 
as FIFA can be infiltrated by a mafia-like organization that 
corrupts the entire process.290 All members of such an 
organization may then be captured under special laws, such as 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO).291 It is true that FIFA is not in essence an FCPA case, 
but the activities of marketing organizations, vis-à-vis quasi-
public associations, nevertheless still represent one way foreign 
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bribery enforcement may be constructed and enforced.292 
In all, there is always the consideration of an authority on 
how the case will be constructed appropriately through its facts, 
and what substantive laws should be applied to such a 
construction. For instance, enforcement authorities may tend to 
apply accounting provisions to situations encompassing 
thousands of bribes in a substantively unrelated project.293 In 
fact, these activities might be seen as the continuation of one 
crime that is attributable to one company. Alternatively, they can 
apply the anti-bribery provisions to activities of multiple 
companies that conspire to win a single project.294 Secondly, 
interpretation of these facts is crucial because it can lead to the 
application of various substantive laws factually capturing 
foreign bribes through means such as accounting, internal 
controls, foreign bribery laws, export laws, or domestic bribery 
laws.295 This substantive concurrence may have serious impacts 
on many related procedural and substantive questions such as 
jurisdiction, coordination and cooperation. 
2) Procedural Fragmentation 
Furthermore, the functional equivalence and legal gaps in 
the OECD Convention may allow enforcement agencies to use 
multiple types of proceedings. Criminal, administrative, or civil 
proceedings include a number of decisions and legally relevant 
facts, some of them developed only in practice. Thus, defining 
“case” in a formal manner would not be useful because, for 
instance, national enforcement authorities negotiate agreements 
with defendants, aiming to speed up the process.296 The 
defendant might provide evidence about its corrupt activities in 
exchange for non-prosecution or deferred prosecution, and lower 
penalties. These practices are formally part of a particular legal 
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proceeding, but they are not final judgments wherein we could 
identify all relevant acts. For instance, in the Siemens case, the 
original enforcers—the U.S. and Germany—divided the 
enforcement scheme into seven interrelated settlements.297 
If we come back to Table 1 above, for instance, it shows how 
the provisions of different national laws—FCPA, OWiG and 
STgB—applied to Siemens’ foreign bribery activities.298 We see 
that different enforcement authorities—SEC, DOJ and German 
prosecutors—used various substantive laws to capture foreign 
bribes.299 The charges have civil and criminal, as well as 
administrative, character.300 Furthermore, we see that some 
subsidiaries were captured via conspiracy charges.301 Table 1 
represents only the original, coordinated German and U.S. 
enforcement action.302 However, many other domestic OECD and 
non-OECD members, along with the World Bank, followed up the 
already-complicated enforcement scheme. Therefore, in the light 
of these findings, the coordination of the broad jurisdictional 
claims is blurred and hard to achieve at the international level. 
This might lead to wasted enforcement resources and prevent 
OECD members from efficiently cooperating, coordinating their 
actions, and using their full potential to hold MNCs accountable 
for transnational bribery. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The OECD Convention represents a “soft law” regulatory 
mechanism that lacks centralized anti-bribery enforcement 
authority. Furthermore, despite its effective implementation 
mechanism that unites 41 countries with many different legal 
and economic backgrounds, the Convention leaves many 
important jurisdictional issues to the discretion of national 
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states. We saw that the U.S. is the leader in the Convention’s 
enforcement and uses conspiracy, aiding and abetting charges, or 
charges based on de facto strict liability of corporations over their 
foreign subsidiaries. These practices help the U.S. capture a 
large part of the global market. 
In theory, extraterritoriality is seen as a unilateral, rather 
than multilateral and collaborative, practice. This practice can 
indeed function in initial stages of international regulatory 
regimes and is appropriate in situations where anti-bribery 
enforcement is lacking. As time passes, however, political and 
legal instruments related to extraterritoriality might not be able 
to cope with the dynamic structural changes of the regime and 
start preventing competitive neutrality and further development 
of the regime. The regime can only reach a new equilibrium if 
enforcers find political and legal instruments of shared 
responsibility or jurisdictional authority over foreign bribery 
spaces. This will be, at least within the scope of the OECD 
Convention, extremely challenging. 
We should further focus on three main areas. Firstly, we 
should acquire more knowledge about how substantive and 
procedural norms and practices in the fields of money 
laundering, export controls or accounting and auditing contrast 
with foreign bribery. Secondly, the procedural issues must be 
taken seriously by nations that should acknowledge the 
importance of principles that may not be common in their 
jurisdictions. Foreign bribery enforcement cannot be optimal 
without balancing some principal legal clashes such as the 
flexibility and effectiveness of prosecution, separation of powers, 
and elementary due process requirements. We have to 
acknowledge that extraterritoriality functions differently in the 
hands of big economies and small economies. Germany and other 
countries, such as the U.K. or Switzerland, should be considered 
as important partners and follow-up enforcement countries. At 
the same time, we see that these countries have difficulties in 
catching foreign bribery schemes in their complexity, and cannot 
be expected to regularly lead many significant enforcement 
actions alone in the near future. In the current framework, it is 
crucial for these, and even smaller economies, to be active by 
providing evidence and other assistance in order to allow 
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enforcement leaders such as the U.S. to lower their enforcement 
costs by punishing complex bribery schemes. Smaller economies 
would then be able to, at least to a certain extent, influence and 
control the leader’s enforcement either through factual or legal 
means. 
While the OECD regulatory framework is an important 
instrument in the fight against transnational corruption and 
bribery, there are other frameworks for coordination of 
extraterritorial enforcement, when, for instance, it comes to anti-
money laundering initiatives. We should consider integrating 
foreign bribery enforcement under the broader scope of these 
frameworks and financial crime regulation. If, however, the 
above-mentioned fragmentation becomes too much of a barrier to 
cooperation and coordination, the enforcement would remain 
highly political. Most probably, possible future enforcement from 
countries, such as Russia and China, may only further increase 
coordination problems. If that becomes the case, we should think 
about how political and “exemplary” extraterritorial enforcement 
may coexist with alternative anti-corruption regulatory 
mechanisms––such as private self-regulation or multi-
stakeholder initiatives––that might be more credible, clear, and 
trustworthy than national states. 
 
